Abstract-The Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) provides a standardized approach to specifying system configuration, vulnerability, patch and compliance management. SCAP comprises a family of existing standards, such as the Open Source Vulnerability Language (OVAL) and the Common Platform Enumeration (CPE). Defining new or extending existing SCAP content is non-trivial and potentially error-prone. For example, specifying a vulnerability in OVAL may appear straightforward, however, the challenge is to specify the vulnerability in such as way that it is consistent with respect to, not just other OVAl data, but also data described under any other standards in SCAP.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) [1] is a NIST standard for automating vulnerability management, asset inventory and policy compliance of security configurations. SCAP encompasses a family of standards. For example, <cpe-item name="cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:3:ga:ws"> is a name describing a Redhat enterprise Linux 3 workstation using the CPE [2] standard for naming assets and is structured according to attributes part, vendor, product, version, update edition and language.
A challenge is the construction of a repository of consistent SCAP definitions. This is non-trivial and potentially errorprone. For example, in addition to the CPE name above, a CPE repository may include the name definition <cpe-item name="cpe:/o:redhat:redhat_ent_linux:3:-:ws"> where the only distinguishing difference is that of the product and update attribute values. The product attribute values enterprise_linux and redhat_ent_linux are implicitly equivalent. Similarly, both ga (Linux general realease) and -signify that the Redhat operating system is an initial release. While the CPE specification provides a syntactic structure for name definitions, it does not explicitly support a semantics for name definitions. In the above example, both CPE definitions are semantically equivalent. As a consequence, the CPE repository is composed of some name definitions that are seemingly distinct but are implicitly equivalent.
Thet paper identifies a number of inconsistencies that can arise in SCAP repositories. These inconsistencies arise due to the syntactic nature of the SCAP data and the paper considers how more consistent SCAP repositories may be constructed by using an ontology. An ontology is used to describe a conceptual model of a domain of interest and provides a semantics for the data. We have developed ontologies for SCAP, including CPE, CVE, CCE and OVAL. This paper is outlined as follows. Section II identifies and discusses some potential inconsistencies in SCAP data. Section III proposes an ontology-based model for SCAP that is an extension of Semantic Threat Graphs [3] . Section IV argues that taking an ontology-based approach helps to avoid inconsistencies in the SCAP data. SectionV considers related research and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SCAP CHALLENGES
SCAP is intended to provide a standard way to describe configuration artifacts representing assets, vulnerabilities threats and countermeasures. While SCAP represents an evolution of a family of existing standards it is constrained in that it must remain faithful to these standards. This can give rise to challenges in ensuring that SCAP artifacts are fully described and that their use is consistent across the standards.
As part of our study a number of SCAP repositories were inspected, including OVAL, CPE, CVE and CCE, for evidence of inconsistencies in specification. The Open Source Vulnerability Language (OVAL) [4] is a standard for describing asset inventory, vulnerabilities, misconfiguration and patch state, in terms of system characteristics and configuration information. The Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) [5] is a standard for identifing and classifying hardware, operating systems and applications for enterprise asset inventory. The Common Vulnerabilities & Exposures (CVE) standard [6] is used to identify and describe known vulnerabilities. The Common Configuration Enumeration (CCE) standard [7] is used to identify and describe best practice recommendations for security configuration.
978-1-4799-0895-0/13/$31.00 ©2013 IEEE 6th Symposium on Security Analytics and Automation 2013 <definition id="oval:org.mitre.oval:def:7123" version="3" class="vulnerability"> <title>Cisco 10000, uBR10012, uBR7200 Series Devices IPC Vulnerability</title> <affected family="ios"> <platform>Cisco IOS</platform> <reference source="CVE" ref_id="CVE-2008-3806" ref_url="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/ cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-3806"/> <description>Cisco IOS 12.0 through 12.4 on Cisco 10000, uBR10012 and uBR7200 series devices handles external UDP packets that are sent to 127.0.0.0/8 addresses intended for IPC communication within the device, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device or linecard reload) via crafted UDP packets, a different vulnerability than CVE-2008-3805.</description> <criterion comment="IOS vulnerable versions" test_ref="oval:org.mitre.oval:tst:9269"/> 
A. Implicit Rationale
The content in a SCAP repository tends to be operational in nature and does not necessarily provide the full rationale for the definition of a SCAP artifact. This implicit rationale may lead to inconsistencies in the artifact definition. For example, the fragment of the OVAL artifact oval:org.mitre.oval:def:7123 in Figure 1 1 describes a Denial of Service related vulnerability in a Cisco router. This OVAL definition explicitly describes how a particular vulnerability may be executed. However, the rationale for the vulnerability is implicit. The definition does not explicitly define why the vulnerability exists: it is implicit that these routers are unable to un-authenticate the origin (local or external) of UDP 127.0.0.0/8 IP packets. Furthermore, it is implicit, in the reference to CVE-2008-3806 , that the Denial of Service is exploitable only when spoofed 127.0.0.0/8 IP are sent to the UDP port (1975) .
The extent to which this kind of implicit information is included in a SCAP definition, when it being written, is arbitrary. Definitions that provide explicit rational and those that rely on implicit rationale are equally possible in SCAP. As a consequence, implicit rationale may lead to misinterpretation by those who seek to use the SCAP repository. For example, a SCAP compliant vulnerability scanner may overlook attributes that are implicit in OVAL diagnosis tests.
B. Implicit Intra-Definition Relationships
The artifacts described in a SCAP repository do not necessarily exist independent of one another; in considering one artifact one needs to be aware of how it relates to the other artifacts in the repository. We argue that these relationships should be explicitly described in the SCAP artifact, however, we have found SCAP definitions whereby the relationships are implicit. These implicit relationships can occur within (intra-) 1 Note that for ease of exposition many of the XML tags are removed <cce cce_id='CCE-14264-6' platform='rhel5' modified='2011-10-07'> <description>The default policy for iptables INPUT (Figure 2 ) which states that one should apply a default firewall policy. However, there is no explicit intuition regarding the kinds of implicit threats or vulnerabilities associated with that recommendation. Notwithstanding compliance requirements [8] - [10] , we argue that in order to provide an effective configuration, an administrator needs to properly understand security countermeasure recommendations. Furthermore, the more information that can be made explicit then the more effective is the operation of an automated tool that uses that information.
C. Implicit Inter-Definition Relationships
The different kinds of SCAP artifacts tend to be siloed with respect to each other. For example, rather than explicitly utilize CPE asset identifiers, OVAL, CVE and CCE definitions implicitly encode the semantics of asset dependencies within the text of their titles and definitions. For example, asset references Cisco 10000, uBR10012 and uBR7200 in Figure 1 implicitly refer to the CPE's outlined in Figure 3 . There is no CPE definition for Cisco 10000. Implicitly it is not the specific Cisco hardware that is vulnerable but rather specific Cisco IOS versions that the hardware supports. Again, the semantics of the affected Cisco IOS CPE definitions ( Figure 4) is implicit in the OVAL definition description. While there is an explicit CVE reference defined within the OVAL definition, it is also implicitly referred to within its description.
<cpe-item name="cpe:/h:cisco:ubr10012:-"> <cpe-item name="cpe:/h:cisco:ubr7200"> Consider the CCE recommendation in Figure 2 concerning the Linux iptables firewall application. Based on the platform defined in CCE-14264-6, one knows that the recommendation is one for a RedHat platform. Curiously there is no CPE identifier for RedHat iptables, however, there is one for Suse Linux iptables. As a consequence, is not immediately clear whether the RedHat iptables recommendation is for iptables firewalls in general, or is specifically related to RedHat. One must refer to the implicit relationship with the NSA's best practice document referenced within the CCE-14264-6 and in other external firewall best practice such as NIST-800-41 [11] to conclude that this recommendation is not RedHat OS specific.
D. Unclear Relationship Reuse
The reuse of relationships across different SCAP definitions may be unclear. For example, the definition of oval:org.mitre.oval:def:11167 definition in Figure 5 is supported by CVE-2009-4272. This defines a denial of service threat as a consequence of crafted packets that force collisions in the IPv4 routing hash table (vulnerability) that is Redhat-centric. However, it is not particularly clear that this same Redhat-centric vulnerability is also a weakness of CentOS and Oracle Linux platforms (assets) as described by the OVAL definition in Figure 5 .
It is not necessarily obvious how SCAP data in one definition may be reused in another definition. For example, the vulnerability described by OVAL definition oval:org.mitre.oval:def:11167 is reused by oval:org.mitre.oval:def:7026 ( Figure 5 ). However, in this instance the affected platform is the VMWare ESX Server. It is not explicit how the vulnerability described by oval:org.mitre.oval:def:11167 that affects various Linux platforms also affects VMWare ESX Server described by oval:org.mitre.oval:def:7026. The title and description of oval:org.mitre.oval:def:7026 explicitly refers to RedHat. Through external knowledge one will discover that VMWare ESX Server is built upon a Linux kernel.
Note that with these reuse examples if the vulnerability was explicitly defined (discussed in Section II-B) in the first place then one could conclude that the vulnerability described by both oval:org.mitre.oval:def:11167 and oval:org.mitre.oval:def:7026 is Linux vendor neutral. That is, it is a Linux kernel 2.6.31 and earlier IPv4 routing hash table collision vulnerability.
<definition id="oval:org.mitre.oval:def:11167" version="5" class="vulnerability"> <affected family="unix"> <platform>Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5</platform> <platform>CentOS Linux 5</platform> <platform>Oracle Linux 5</platform> <reference source="CVE" ref_id="CVE-2009-4272" ref_url="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/ cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-4272"/> <description>A certain Red Hat patch for net/ipv4/route.c in the Linux kernel 2.6.18 on Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) 5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (deadlock) via crafted packets that force collisions in the IPv4 routing hash table, and trigger a routing "emergency" in which a hash chain is too long. NOTE: this is related to an issue in the Linux kernel before 2.6.31, when the kernel routing cache is disabled, involving an uninitialized pointer and a panic.</description> . <definition id="oval:org.mitre.oval:def:7026" version="3" class="vulnerability"> <title>Red Hat Linux Kernel Routing Implementation Multiple Remote Denial of Service Vulnerabilities</title> <affected family="unix"> <platform>VMWare ESX Server 4</platform> <reference source="CVE" ref_id="CVE-2009-4272" ref_url="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/ cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-4272"/> <description>A certain Red Hat patch for net/ipv4/route.c in the Linux kernel 2.6.18 on Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL) 5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (deadlock) via crafted packets that force collisions in the IPv4 routing hash table, and trigger a routing "emergency" in which a hash chain is too long. NOTE: this is related to an issue in the Linux kernel before 2.6.31, when the kernel routing cache is disabled, involving an uninitialized pointer and a panic.</description> 
E. Unclear Definition Hierarchy
SCAP definitions are typically developed in isolation, that is, they focus on a single asset, threat, vulnerability or countermeasure. As a consequence, it can become difficult to inter-relate implicit information across multiple SCAP definitions. Consider OVAL vulnerability definitions oval:org.mitre.oval:def:7123 (Figure 1) and oval:org.mitre.oval:def:5910 ( Figure  6 ), which are effectively equivalent. The only distinguishing difference is that oval:org.mitre.oval:def:5910 prescribes an additional SIP test in the test tag reference (test_ref="oval:org.mitre.oval:tst:23990"/>). This test is carried out in order to verify whether an asset is vulnerable to un-authenticated UDP 127.0.0.0/8 IP packets. The OVAL definitions state that: "a different vulnerability 6th Symposium on Security Analytics and Automation 2013 <definition id="oval:org.mitre.oval:def:5910" version="3" class="vulnerability"> <title>Cisco 10000, uBR10012, uBR7200 Series Devices IPC Vulnerability</title> <affected family="ios"> <platform>Cisco IOS</platform> <reference source="CVE" ref_id="CVE-2008-3805" ref_url="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/ cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-3805"/> <description>Cisco IOS 12.0 through 12.4 on Cisco 10000, uBR10012 and uBR7200 series devices handles external UDP packets that are sent to 127.0.0.0/8 addresses intended for IPC communication within the device, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device or linecard reload) via crafted UDP packets, a different vulnerability than CVE-2008-3806.</description> <criterion comment="IOS vulnerable versions" test_ref="oval:org.mitre.oval:tst:9269"/> <criterion comment="config contains SIP" test_ref="oval:org.mitre.oval:tst:23990"/> 
F. Definition Name Ambiguity
Ambiguities can arise in the definition of SCAP names/identifiers. In the CPE repository there is a CPE definition for a Cisco ubr7200 cable router (the 1 st cpeitem XML tag in Figure 7) . However, there is nothing to prevent additional CPE names being added at a later date (for example, the 2 nd and 3 rd cpe-item XML tags in Figure 7 ). The CPE naming specification does not allow for defining explicit inter-relationships between (equivalent) CPE definitions. As a consequence, it is unclear if these CPE definitions represent the same Cisco ubr7200 cable router asset or a set of distinct Cisco ubr7200 based cable router assets.
G. The Potential for SCAP Inconsistencies
The extent to which implicit information is included in a SCAP definition, when it being written, is arbitrary. The above examples demonstrate the potential for inconsistencies in SCAP definitions as a consequence of a reliance on implicit information. In principle, if SCAP definitions/artifacts were sufficiently explicit then such inconsistencies should not emerge. In the next section a formal model is developed for SCAP which seeks to avoid these inconsistencies by requiring explicit declaration of information used in SCAP definitions.
III. A SEMANTIC THREAT GRAPHS MODEL FOR SCAP
Rather than developing a SCAP ontology from scratch, we found it more effective to describe SCAP concepts as an extension of a Semantic Threat Graph (STG) ontology [3] . This is not unreasonable given that both SCAP and STGs are concerned with describing assets, vulnerabilities, threats and countermeasures and their relationships. Semantic Threat Graphs are defined using Description Logic (DL), a decidable portion of first-order logic [12] . Concepts represent sets of individuals and properties represent binary relations applied to individuals. Note that in presenting the model components, for reasons of space, we do not provide complete specifications in particular, definitions do not include disjoint axioms, subproperties, data type properties or closure axioms. Figure 8 provides an abstract model of a semantic threat graph that illustrates the SCAP concepts involved and their relationships. Figure 9 provides an example instantiation of this model for oval:org.mitre.oval:def:7123, the OVAL definition illustrated in Figure 1 . Note, the dashed property lines and the hollow individual nodes are not explicitly part of the encoding of this OVAL definition
A. Asset
Concept Asset represents any entity of interest within the enterprise that may be the subject of a threat. While assets can include people and physical infrastructure, this paper only considers computer-system based entities such as Cisco routers, firewalls and so forth.
Assets may have zero or more vulnerabilities (∀ restriction) along property hasW eakness. As a result, those assets may be exposed to various individuals of the T hreat Concept Asset is further specialised to have more specific kinds of asset concepts, for example, Application, OperatingSystem, Hardware ⊑ Asset representing the set of Application, OperatingSystem and Hardware individuals that an enterprise may have. The Asset concept property relation hasAssetIDRef is also further specialised to more specific kinds of range relationships. For example, the hasCP ERef ⊑ hasAssetIDRef defines a sub-property relation used to relate individuals of the Asset concept to specific range concept, namely CP EDef (CPE definitions). The hasCP ERef property relation asserts the relationship between assets and their associate CPE definition names. Note, this sub-property has the following restriction: Asset ⊑ ∃ =1 hasCP ERef.CP EDef stating that an asset must have at most one reference to a CPE definition.
Consider the oval:org.mitre.oval:def:7123 definition outlined in Figure 1 as a running example. A Cisco cable router individual a UBR7200 , an instance of the Hardware concept (inferred as an individual of concept Asset) is vulnerable to receiving unauthenticated 127.0.0.0/8 UDP packets (individual vul Unauth127.0.0.0/8Pkt ). As a consequence, a UBR7200 isT hreatenedBy an IPC Denial of Service attack (individual threat IPCDoSUDP127/8pkt ). The following fragment of the ontology asserts these facts.
Asset(a UBR7200 ) ← hasW eakeness(a UBR7200 , vul Unauth127.0.0.0/8Pkt ) ⊓ isT hreatenedBy(a UBR7200 , threat IPCDoSUDP127/8pkt ) Note, in order to avoid having to explain the low-level details of each ontology individual, individuals are given human readable names as a syntactic sugar that contain a semantics of what each individual represents.
Asset individual a UBR7200 is asserted to have a relationship with the following cpe cpe:/h:cisco:ubr7200 individual along property hasCP ERef . Note, for further reference, an ontology model for CPE definitions is presented in Appendix A.
Asset(a UBR7200 ) ← hasCP ERef (a UBR7200 , cpe cpe:/h:cisco:ubr7200 )
Cisco's UBR2700 router (individual a UBR7200 ) has a role that protects internal assets inclusive of itself. The following fragment of the ontology asserts that the a UBR7200 asset protects itself from the vul Unauth127.0.0.0/8Pkt by implementing an IOS firewall countermeasure that denies inbound external IP packets with source addresses within the 127.0.0.0/8 range destined to port 1975 (ios DenyInSrcIP127/8DstPort1975 ). This recommendation is considered a Cisco best practice [13] .
Asset(a UBR7200 ) ← protects(a UBR7200 , a UBR7200 ) ⊓ implements(a UBR7200 , ios DenyInSrcIP127/8DstPort1975 )
B. Threat
A threat is a potential for violation of security [14] . An individual of the T hreat concept is considered to exploit one or more vulnerabilities (∃ ≥1 restriction).
Continuing to use the oval:org.mitre.oval:def:7123 definition as a running example, an individual of concept T hreat, threat IPCDoSUDP127/8pkt , threatens the Cisco cable router a UBR7200 asset.
T hreat(threat IPCDoSUDP127/8pkt ) ← exploits(threat IPCDoSUDP127/8pkt , vul Unauth127.0.0.0/8Pkt ) ⊓ threatens(threat IPCDoSUDP127/8pkt , a UBR7200 )
C. Vulnerability
A vulnerability is a flaw or security weakness in an asset that has the potential to be exploited by a threat. Concept V ulnerability is the set of concrete vulnerabilities. Each 6th Symposium on Security Analytics and Automation 2013 vulnerability individual may have zero or more SCAP vulnerability definition (SCAPVulDef concept) reference relationships (hasV ulRef ).
Note, property hasV ulRef is further specialised as hasCV ERef and hasOV ALV ulRef . In addition, concept SCAP V ulDef is further specialised as follows: CV EDef, OV ALV ulDef ⊑ SCAP V ulDef and is representative of CVE and OVAL vulnerability definitions respectively.
The following fragment in the ontology states that asset a UBR7200 is susceptible to a threat IPCDoSUDP127/8pkt attack via the vul Unauth127.0.0.0/8Pkt weakness. Note, vul Unauth127.0.0.0/8Pkt is representative of a weakness in the TCP stack where it is not possible to authenticate the origin of localhost IP packets. This explicit vulnerability has a reference to the oval oval:org.mitre.oval:def:7123 definition individual along the hasOVALVulRef property relation.
A countermeasure is an action or process that mitigates vulnerabilities and prevents and/or reduces threats. A countermeasure is an asset and may have zero or more SCAP countermeasure references along property hasCtrRef.
Note, property hasCtrRef is further specialised as hasCCERef and hasOV ALComplianceRef . Concept IOSRule is representative of the Cisco IOS firewall rules that mitigate one or more vulnerabilities, provided they are implemented by F irewall individuals where
The following fragment in the ontology states that the Cisco IOS firewall rule individual ios DenyInSrcIP127/8DstPort1975 , mitigates the vulnerability vul Unauth127.0.0.0/8Pkt on the Cisco cable router (a UBR7200 ).
IOSRule(ios
For the sake of clarity, a number of property relationships have been excluded from this discussion. Assets, threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures have additional properties.
IV. SCAP CHALLENGES REVISITED
This section revisits the SCAP challenges outlined in Section II and discusses how the inconsistencies may be avoided.
A. Explicit Rationale
The semantic threat graph framework makes the implicit rationale outlined in Section II-A explicit by asserting why it is a vulnerability exists. For example, Cisco routers described in the OVAL oval:org.mitre.oval:def:7123 definition are unable to authenticate the origin (local or external) of UDP 127.0.0.0/8 IP packets. This vulnerability is asserted as individual vul Unauth127.0.0.0/8Pkt . An OVAL vulnerability definition reference relationship (hasOV ALV ulRef ) between this vulnerability and the OVAL oval oval:org.mitre.oval:def:7123 definition individual is also asserted (Figure 9) .
B. Explicit Intra-Definition Relationships
The implicit entities and relationships that can occur within the same SCAP definition are made explicit. For example, it becomes possible to explicitly consider the relationships with the relevant asset and corresponding threat for the vul Unauth127.0.0.0/8Pkt vulnerability ( Figure 9 ). That is, vulnerability vul Unauth127.0.0.0/8Pkt isAWeaknessOf asset a UBR7200 and as a consequence it isT hreatendedBy threat threat IPCDoSUDP127/8pkt .
C. Explicit Inter-Definition Relationships
Using the semantic threat graphs framework, the semantics of the affected Cisco hardware CPE definitions implicit in Figure 1 are made explicit. For example, the Cisco cable router asset individual a UBR7200 is asserted to have a hasCPERef property relationship with CPE definition individual cpe cpe:/h:cisco:ubr7200 .
D. Explicit Definition Hierarchies
In simple terms, the SCAP repository is effectively a forest of inter-related SCAP definitions that does not have an explicit hierarchical structure. Under the ontology Open World Assumption [15] , the semantic threat graphs framework is extensible where further sub-concepts and sub-properties can be defined. For example, concept CP EDef is a subconcept of the set of all SCAP based asset identifications (concept SCAP AssetDef ). This concept can be further specialised:CP EHW, CP EOS, CP EApp ⊑ CP EDef where these sub-concepts are representative of CPE hardware, operating system and application definition names respectively. Concept CP EHW in turn may be further specialised: CP EHW Cisco, CP EHW Redhat ⊑ CP EHW . Figure 10 illustrates a fragment of the CPE concept hierarchy. If individual cpe cpe:/h:cisco:ubr7200 is asserted as a member of concept CP EHW Cisco then it will be inferred as a member of all its parent concepts. 
E. Explicit Relationship Reuse
The semantic threat graphs framework provides a basis for the explicit reuse of SCAP data within and across SCAP definitions. Figure 11 illustrates a fragment of SCAP definition reuse.
F. Non-Ambiguous Definition Names
Unique Name Assumption is not supported in Description Logic. As a result, unless explicitly stated otherwise, it cannot be assumed that individuals identified with different names are distinct. Consider the example in Figure 7 . A Cisco UBR7200 cable router asset (individual a UBR7200 ), amongst other concept restrictions, may only have a relationship (∃ =1 hasCP ERef.CP EDef ) to one CPE definition. If individuals of concept CP EDef namely cpe cpe:/h:cisco:ubr7200 , cpe cpe:/h:cisco:ciscoubr7200 and cpe cpe:/h:cisco:ciscorouterubr7200 are not explicitly defined as distinct from each other then these CPE definition individuals will be inferred to represent the same individual. However, if these individuals have been asserted as distinct, then an inconsistency will be detected when reasoning over the model. V. RELATED RESEARCH By interpreting SCAP in terms of Semantic Threat Graphs, it has been possible to demonstrate that encoding SCAP data within an ontology can help to avoid the kinds of inconsistencies discussed in Section II. Semantic threat graphs have been shown to be effective for modeling and reasoning about high-level best practice security recommendations, such as those from NIST standards, in terms of low-level assets, threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures [3] . The observations about SCAP in this paper are not confined to Semantic Threat Graphs; we conjecture that similar observations could be arrived at by developing an SCAP ontology from scratch or by using other ontology-based threat models [16] , [17] .
A general purpose asset management ontology is presented in [18] . In [19] , an ontology for CCE is presented and an ontology for CVE is presented in [20] . Mathews et. al. [17] use Notation-3 encodings built from an ontology of National Vulnerability Database data to provide context information for improving intrusion detection.
In [21] , [22] , ontologies have been shown to be effective at modelling and reasoning about low-level systems security configurations (for example [21] , [22] ). Thus, we argue an ontology engineering approach to encode existing low-level SCAP repository information is practical.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION This paper identified a number of consistency challenges that can occur in SCAP repositories. For example, implicit definition relationships. A semantic threat graphs model for SCAP was used as a systematic approach to make the implicit explicit within and across inter-related SCAP definitions, thereby providing a basis to avoid such inconsistencies.
Future research will consider a number of additional inconsistency classifications. For example, Definition Error Detection and Implicit Inter-Definition Vulnerability Cascade. The OVAL oval:org.mitre.oval:def:14812 definition ( Figure 12 ) is an example where there is an integer overflow in Adobe Reader on Linux platforms and (in contradiction) this vulnerability affects Microsoft Windows platforms. Security configurations (inclusive of patches) used to mitigate vulnerabilities may in turn themselves introduce vulnerabilities. In SCAP these cyclic dependencies between seemingly disparate vulnerabilities are implicit, giving rise to a further Implicit Inter-Definition Vulnerability Cascade inconsistency classification. The OVAL oval:org.mitre.oval:def:11167 definition outlined in Figure 5 is an example where a Redhat patch gave rise to this particular vulnerability.
<definition id="oval:org.mitre.oval:def:14812" version="6" class="vulnerability"> <title>Integer overflow in Adobe Reader 9.x before 9.4.6 on Linux allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors.</title> <affected family="windows"> Fig. 12 Concepts P art and RF C4646T ag are defined as enumerated sets of individuals. Individuals of concept P art represent hardware (h), operating systems (o) and applications (a) respectively. Concept RED4646T ag represents the set of RFC defined tags for identifying languages [23] .
P art ≡ {h, o, a} RF C4646T ag ≡ {en-US, zh-tw, ja-JP, . . . }
The following fragment of the ontology asserts individual cpe 1 has name definition 'cpe:/h:cisco:ubr7200' and is composed of the following hardware h, vendor cisco and product ubr7200 individuals.
CP EW F N (cpe 1 ) ← hasN ame(cpe 1 , 'cpe:/h:cisco:ubr7200') ⊓ hasP art(cpe 1 , h) ⊓ hasV endor(cpe 1 , cisco) ⊓ hasP roduct(cpe 1 , ubr7200)
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